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The impact of the financial crisis on community banks:  
A conference summary
by Mark H. Kawa, vice president, Supervision and Regulation, and Steven VanBever, lead supervision analyst, Supervision and Regulation
The fifth annual Community Bankers Symposium, co-sponsored by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Chicago and the Midwest Region of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
was held at the Chicago Fed on November 6, 2009. This article summarizes the key 
presentations and discussions at the conference.
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Community banks and the financial 
crisis
Tannenbaum­proposed­that,­while­the­
extent­and­magnitude­of­the­recent­Community banks in virtually every region of the country face 


























































































































































Vice President and Director of Research; Douglas­D.­Evanoff,­
Vice President,­financial studies; Jonas­D.­M.­Fisher,­
Vice President, macroeconomic policy research; Daniel­
Aaronson, Vice President, microeconomic policy research; 
William­A.­Testa,­Vice President, regional programs, and 
























Many speakers expressed confidence that community banks 
























































































What should community banks  
focus on?
Kawa­provided­a­number­of­suggestions­
for­how­community­banks­can­respond­
effectively­to­current­risk-management­
challenges.­In­light­of­current­weaknesses­
in­CRE­lending,­he­said,­banks­should­
“expect­the­unexpected.”­This­means­
anticipating­a­range­of­adverse­scenarios­
that­reflect­local­economic­conditions­
and­the­bank’s­individual­risk­profile.­
Such­“stress­testing”­can­be­very­helpful­
in­identifying­potential­effects­on­earn-
ings­and­capital­and­developing­appro-
priate­responses.­Since­market­analysts­
are­conducting­their­own­stress­tests­of­
banks’­exposures,­it­is­better­for­banks­
to­be­ahead­of­the­curve.
In­an­effort­to­diversify­away­from­CRE­
lending,­many­community­banks­have­
increased­their­exposure­to­commercial­
lending.13­However,­credit­deterioration­
is­spilling­over­to­this­type­of­lending­as­
well.­Banks­now­focusing­on­increasing­
commercial­lending,­Kawa­recommended,­
should­develop­sound­business­strategies­
based­on­a­realistic­assessment­of­internal­
and­external­strengths­and­weaknesses.­
They­should­also­have­a­robust­process­
for­approving­new­products­or­activities­
and­appropriate­policies­and­limits­gov-
erning­loan­participations­and­purchases.
For­most­community­banks,­funding­
has­stabilized­since­the­earlier­stages­of­
the­financial­crisis.­However,­funding­
sources­can­disappear­when­a­bank­is­
perceived­to­have­asset­quality­or­earn-
ings­problems.­Therefore,­banks­should­
perform­liquidity­risk­analyses­that­con-
sider­potential­funding­pressures,­Kawa­
advised.­These­analyses­should­make­
use­of­forward-looking­metrics­as­much­
as­possible­and­consider­a­wide­range­
of­stress­scenarios.1­Community­banks­are­typically­smaller­
banks­that­conduct­most­of­their­business­in­
their­local­communities.­The­size­threshold­
most­often­used­is­$1­billion­in­assets.
2­The­Chicago­Fed­serves­the­Seventh­Federal­
Reserve­District,­which­comprises­all­of­Iowa­
and­most­of­Illinois,­Indiana,­Michigan,­
and­Wisconsin.
3­CRE­lending­refers­to­loans­secured­by­
commercial­real­estate­(e.g.,­office­buildings­
and­shopping­centers),­whose­repayment­
typically­comes­from­rental­income­or­
sale/refinancing­of­the­property.
4­Securitization­is­the­process­of­taking­an­
illiquid­asset­(or­group­of­assets)­and,­
through­financial­engineering,­converting­
it­into­a­security.
5­Originate-to-distribute­is­a­business­model­
for­financial­intermediation,­under­which­
financial­institutions­originate­loans­such­as­
mortgages,­repackage­them­into­securitized­
products,­and­then­sell­these­products­­
to­investors.­
6­The­shadow­banking­system­is­a­network­
of­lenders,­brokers,­and­opaque­financing­
vehicles­outside­the­traditional­banking­
system­that­has­grown­substantially­in­recent­
years­and­is­much­less­regulated­than­the­
traditional­banking­system.
7­Examples­of­wholesale­funding­are­federal­
funds,­Federal­Home­Loan­Bank­advances,­
and­brokered­certificates­of­deposit.
8­The­provision­for­loan­losses­is­the­amount­
set­aside­by­a­bank­to­maintain­its­loan­
loss­reserve­at­a­level­sufficient­to­absorb­
estimated­loan­losses.
9­See­www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
press/bcreg/20091030a.htm.­This­policy­was­
issued­by­the­Federal­Reserve,­the­FDIC,­the­
National­Credit­Union­Administration,­the­
Office­of­the­Comptroller­of­the­Currency,­
the­Office­of­Thrift­Supervision,­and­the­
Federal­Financial­Institutions­Examination­
Council­State­Liaison­Committee.
10­ For­the­final­rule,­see­www.fdic.gov/news/
news/press/2009/pr09203.html.
11­ Capacity­utilization­is­calculated­as­the­actual­
output­produced­with­installed­equipment­
divided­by­the­potential­output­that­could­
be­produced­with­it­if­used­to­its­full­capacity.
12­ Regulatory­authorities­have­strong­incentives­
to­prevent­the­failure­of­a­large,­highly­inter-
connected­financial­firm­because­of­the­risks­
that­such­a­failure­would­pose­to­the­finan-
cial­system­and­the­broader­economy.­How-
ever,­the­belief­of­market­participants­that­
a­particular­firm­is­considered­too­big­to­
fail­has­a­number­of­potential­undesirable­
effects,­including­reduced­market­discipline,­
excessive­risk-taking,­and­increased­costs­
to­the­Deposit­Insurance­Fund.
13­ Commercial­loans­are­loans­made­to­busi-
nesses­for­a­wide­variety­of­business­purposes­
(such­as­inventory­financing­and­investments­
in­equipment).
14­ See­www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
srletters/2009/SR0904.htm.
In­today’s­volatile­environment,­capital­
adequacy­is­critical.­While­many­banks­
have­capital­ratios­well­above­regulatory­
minimums,­Kawa­said,­this­does­not­
guarantee­that­a­bank­will­have­enough­
capital­to­survive­a­severe­shock.­Regu-
lators­are­placing­more­emphasis­than­
ever­on­sound­capital­planning.­Capital­
plans­should­include­forward-looking­
analyses­of­different­economic­scenarios.­
They­should­also­take­into­account­divi-
dend­payouts­and­stock­repurchases­
and­redemptions.14­
Conclusion
While­the­symposium­highlighted­numer-
ous­challenges­facing­community­banks,­
many­of­the­speakers­also­expressed­con-
fidence­that­community­banks­would­
continue­to­play­a­key­role­in­the­finan-
cial­system.­Community­banks’­local­con-
nections­and­greater­familiarity­with­local­
conditions­can­give­them­an­edge­in­meet-
ing­the­needs­of­households­and­small­
businesses.­The­information­they­possess­
about­local­borrowers­can­be­a­source­of­
competitive­advantage­in­making­judg-
ments­about­creditworthiness.­In­the­
current­crisis,­as­some­larger­banks­are­
improving­their­capital­and­liquidity­
positions­and­cutting­back­on­new­lend-
ing,­community­banks­may­discover­new­
opportunities­to­serve­customers.­Com-
munity­banks­continue­to­be­a­leading­
provider­of­credit­to­small­businesses,­
whose­growth­is­critical­to­creating­new­
jobs­and­improving­the­broader­economy.­
In­his­closing­comments,­Lowe­stressed­
that­the­FDIC­and­the­other­regulators­
will­work­with­community­banks­to­find­
solutions­and­strategies­that­address­
their­mutual­concerns.